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statute, when the only state remedies seemed to be the three blind
alleys of habeas corpus, 51 writ of error,5 2 and writ of error coram
nobis. 53 The opinion, however, discloses two possible limitations
upon the prisoner's right to review. In the first place, the court
does not foreclose consideration of a former adjudication as evidence on the question as to whether defendant's constitutional
rights have been infringed; it merely holds that the former
adjudication shall not be conclusive. Secondly, the defendant
may have "waived" his constitutional rights, either by failure to
assert them at the trial, where opportunity was had, or by failing
to seek review of a decision adverse to his claim, as where the
prisoner is financially unable to obtain the transcript necessary
for an effective review on writ of error. Legislation providing
for a prompt, inexpensive, full and adequate review of every
felony conviction might yet be the only real solution.
V. FAMILY LAW
Although there is little new in the law concerning marriage,'
some matters regarding divorce call for attention. In Elston v.
Elston,2 for example, the well-established doctrine of recrimination
was applied by the court, acting as representative of the state's
interest in the preservation of the marriage relation, despite the
51 That remedy, in Illinois, is appropriate only to test the Jurisdiction of the
court in which petitioner was tried: People v. Bradley, 391 Ill. 169, 62 N. E. (2d)
788 (1945). There is no right to an appeal and the Illinois Supreme Court will not
entertain original proceedings which present a fact question: People ex rel. Jones
v. Robinson, 409 Ill. 553, 101 N. E. (2d) 100 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KEqT LAW
RWviEw 282.
52 As an indigent defendant cannot afford to pay for a stenographic transcript of
the trial proceedings, review by way of writ of error is, to all practical effect,
confined to the common law record, that is to the indictment, the arraignment,
the entry of the plea, the fact of a trial, and the verdict and judgment thereon.
The writ of error, under such circumstance, is ineffective to review alleged violations of constitutional rights, except those which may be revealed on the face of the
common law record.
53 The statutory writ of error coram nobis, based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 196, permits the presentation only of those questions of fact unknown
at the time of trial. It is clearly unsuitable to fit the typical situation.
1 The case of Whelan v. Whelan, 346 Ill. App. 445, 105 N. E. (2d) 314 (1952),
might be mentioned as it represents the first clear-cut application of the Uniform
Marriage Evasion Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 89, § 19 et seq., to a marriage
performed elsewhere, but which would have been void if performed in Illinois,
between first cousins.
2344 111. App. 233, 100 N. E. (2d) 635 (1951), noted in 15 U. of Det. L. J. 156.
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fact the defense had not been specially pleaded and was not being
urged by the defendant.
Termination of an obligation to pay alimony was the ultimate
problem involved in one notable decision achieved by the United
States Supreme Court having bearing on the degree of full faith
and credit due a foreign decree. As the result of its decision in
Sutton v. Lieb,8 further construction will probably have to be
given to Section 18 of the Divorce Act 4 and the effect to be given
to an allegedly void marriage after a decree for divorce, with
alimony, had been rendered which. provided that a party to the
divorce should not be entitled to further alimony in the event
of a remarriage.
Property rights of the spouses, or ex-spouses, also came in
for consideration. In People v. Walker,5 a matter actually arising
under a claim concerning an inheritance tax, the Supreme Court
applied the well-established rule that a contract, in this case a
conveyance in trust, inducing divorce and made in consideration
thereof would be void and unenforcible, not only because based
upon a void consideration but also because it would tend to open
the door to collusion. In another case, that of McGaughy v. McGaughy,6 the 1949 amendment to the Divorce Act permitting a
divorce court to order a conveyance of real property in lieu
of alimony,7 was limited by construction to those cases in which
some "special circumstance" made the conveyance equitable."
8342 U. S. 402, 72 S. Ct. 398, 96 L. Ed. (adv.) 352 (1952), noted In 30 CmIcAGOKENT LAw REVIEw 266. The Supreme Court decision reversed the holding in 188
F. (2d) 766 (1951), which had affirmed the District Court, 91 F. Supp. 937 (1950).
It is understood that, on remandment, but not within the period of this survey, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit treated the alleged marriage of the
alimony recipient as totally void, hence inoperative to extinguish the alimony
obligation created by the prior divorce decree: 199 F. (2d) 163 (1952).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
5409 Ill. 413, 100 N. E. (2d) 621 (1951), noted in 15 U. of Det. L. J. 152.
6410 Ill. 596, 102 N. E. (2d) 806 (1952), noted in 30 C1icAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw
280. The decision may, to some extent, have been dictated by the fact that most
of the property came to the husband by inheritance and was not susceptible of
division.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
8 Ibid., Ch. 40, § 18, empowers the divorce court to compel a conveyance when
either party holds title to property equitably belonging to the other. To support
action under this section, special circumstances and equities must be alleged and
proved: Insoda v. Insoda, 400 Ill. 596, 81 N. E. (2d) 473 (1948).
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Despite a recent Supreme Court statement that "special circumstance" need not be shown in order to justify such an order,9
the construction so placed apparently limits the statute in question
to a simple codification of the former law. An oral property settlement intended to bar dower rights was held binding and enforcible in Parker v. Ter Bush.10 The terms of the agreement had
been set out in the verified complaint for divorce, but a detailed
recitation of the agreement was omitted from the decree. Eight
years later, in a suit to quiet title, the ex-wife claimed her oral
promise to surrender dower was within the statute of frauds but
the court held the agreement to be so well supported by evidence
that it would be inequitable to deny the relief sought."
Several custodial and other related cases, although not new,
are worth observing for their effect in crystallizing the rules which
they apply. The mere status of godparent, for example, is not
enough, according to People ex rel. Smilga v. Hoyer,1 2 to entitle
one to notice of adoption proceedings but might be if actual custody in fact should be present. A parent may not, on religious
grounds, prevent the administration of a vitally needed blood
transfusion to his child and, if he should attempt so to do, under
the holding in People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,1 3 a guardian may
be appointed to provide the necessary consent on behalf of the
child. The power of a chancery court to permit a divorced parent
who has been awarded custody of a child to establish a home for
9 In Persico v. Persico, 409 Ill. 413, 100 N. E. (2d) 904 (1951), the court care.fully distinguished between a proceeding under the section mentioned in the preceding footnote and one under Section 18, as amended in 1949, authorizing the divorce
court to order a conveyance of real property by way of settlement in lieu of
alimony.
10 344 Ill. App. 354, 100 N. E. (2d) 810 (1951).
Leave to appeal has been denied.
11 The case appears to be the first in Illinois to uphold an oral property settlement. Written separation agreements have often been said to be valid: Kohler v.
Kohler, 316 Il. 33, 146 N. E. 476 (1925), and cases there cited.
12 Sub nom. Klabis v. Hoyer, 345 Ill. App. 365, 103 N. E. (2d) 378 (1952), noted
in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 380. In another adoption case, that of Stalder v.
Stone, 344 Ill. App. 266, 100 N. E. (2d) 497 (1951), the Appellate Court for the
Second District concluded the evidence was insufficient to terminate the right of
the natural parent to her child. The Supreme Court, however, on leave to appeal,
came to an opposite conclusion: 412 Ill. 488, 107 N. E. (2d) 696 (1952). Crampton,
J., wrote a dissenting opinion in which he differentiated conduct sufficient to warrant termination of custodial rights from that necessary to justify an adoption
over parental protest.
13411 II. 618, 104 N. E. (2d) 769 (1952).
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such child in another jurisdiction has been clarified by the Appellate Court for the Second District through its determination in
Schmidt v. Schmidt. 14 Pointing to the fact that there is no fixed
rule of law prohibiting removal of the child from the jurisdiction,
the court there distinguished cases apparently to the contrary 5
either because the terms of the decree barred removal' 6 or upon
the consideration that the best interests of the child would suffer
by such removal. The court noted that where, as in the case before
it, a bond had been given to secure visitation rights and the decree
awarding custody contained no geographical limitations on the
exercise of custodial rights, a strict rule of law on the point would
not only be unrealistic but might be detrimental to the welfare
of the child.
In Nye v. Nye, 17 the defendant, contrary to the terms of an
agreement and decree, removed the child from plaintiff's custody.
In answer to plaintiff's petition to compel surrender of the child, defendant counter-petitioned for a modification of the custody order,
asserting the plaintiff to be an unfit person by reason of her illicit
relationship with another man prior to and since the divorce. The
Appellate Court for the First District had reversed a modification
order, holding that plaintiff's immoral conduct did not represent
a material change in circumstance affecting the welfare of the
child. This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court but not
without a vigorous dissent by Judge Bristow who critically observed that the court had adopted "the unique position that since
14 346 Il. App. 436, 105 N. E. (2d) 117 (1952).
15 Thbe same court, in the earlier case of Wade v. Wade, 345 Ill. App. 170 at 177,
102 N. E. (2d) 356 at 360 (1951), had said: "It is true our courts have stated that
it is against the policy of our laws to permit children to be taken outside of the
jurisdiction of the court where their custody has been given to one parent under a
divorce decree, the reason being that in doing this the court is prevented from
carrying out the mandates of its decrees." It was held, however, that the defendant, father of the child and an Illinois resident, in legal custody under a divorce
decree, was not in contempt of court merely because he had permitted the child to
live in Iowa with the family of the defendant's cousin.
16 See Martinec v. Sharapata, 328 Ill. App. 339, 66 N. E. (2d) 103 (1946).
17411 Ill. 408, 105 N. E. (2d) 300 (1952), affirming 343 Ill. App. 477, 99 N. E.
(2d) 574 (1951). An identical report of the majority opinion, minus the dissenting
opinion, originally appeared in the advance sheet at 104 N. E. (2d) 283, but was
withdrawn by order of the court: 104 N. E. (2d), p. xii.
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they simply continued their clandestine relationship there was no
change in conditions."l
By far the most significant developments in family law came
in relation to tort liability between the spouses arising from acts
committed during coverture. The Illinois Supreme Court decision
in Welch v. Davis19 not only settled the question as to whether
or not an action might be maintained against the estate of a
husband responsible for the wrongful death of his wife but also
appears to have opened the door to even more startling developments. The holding therein was soon followed by the decision
in Tallios v. Tallios20 wherein the Appellate Court for the First
District similarly permitted a recovery based upon a wrong between husband and wife. The plaintiff there had been injured
by the negligence of her husband while he was driving a truck
in furtherance of his employer's business. Her suit to recover
damages from the husband's employer had been dismissed in the
trial court but that judgment was reversed when the Appellate
Court held that any immunity given to a spouse operated merely
to deny the remedy but did not affect the right of action. 21 The
22
New York case of Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Company
was approved and relied upon.
Direct attack upon inter-spousal immunity for tortious acts
28
did not come, however, until the plaintiff, in Brandt v. Keller,
18 411 Ill. 408 at 419, 105 N. E. (2d) 300 at 306.
19410 Ill. 130, 101 N. E. (2d) 547 (1951), reversing 342 Il. App. 69, 95 N. E.
(2d) 108 (1950). The principal case has been commented upon in 32 Bost. L. Rev.
250; 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 330; 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvrEw 343; 1 DePaul L. Rev.
B. J. 242; 1951 Ill. L. Forum 681; 36 Marquette L. Rev. 129; 9 N. A.
296; 40 Ill.
C. C. A. L. J. 215; 31 Neb. L. Rev. 628; 27 N. Y. U. L. Q. 516; 38 Va. L. Rev. 402;
and 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 235.
20345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N. E. (2d) 507 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Rsvmw 343 and 40 Ill. B. J. 5W3. See also the later case of Kitch v. Adkins, 346
Ill. App. 342, 105 N. E. (2d) 527 (1952), where the court decided a similar fact
situation without discussion of the marital immunity.
21 The court cited, with approval, Restatement, Agency, Vol. 1, § 217(2), comment
(b), p. 480, for the rule that the principal does not share in an immunity personal
to the agent.
22 249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42 (1928).
23 347 Ill. App. 18, 105 N. E. (2d) 796 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
Ruvmw 343. It is understood that the Illinois Supreme Court, on leave to appeal,
reversed the decision of the Appellate Court, but no opinion has yet been released
for publication in case No. 32484.
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having sustained personal injuries by reason of her husband's
negligent operation of an automobile, sought to recover damages
24
from him on the basis that the several Married Women's Acts
had removed the common-law rule. The Appellate Court for the
First District found difficulties with this argument which it considered to be insuperable. In the first place, the acts do not
purport to remove the husband's common law disability from suing
his wife in tort so a construction thereof which would permit a suit
by the wife would create an inequality between the sexes contrary
to the policy contemplated by the legislature. 2 5 Secondly, the
Married Women's Acts were said to have expressly removed only
those disabilities peculiar to married women, giving such persons
the right to sue separately in only a limited group of cases, hence
were inadequate to remove common law disabilities between the
spouses. A forthright decision by the Supreme Court or substantial statutory revision by the legislature would now seem to be in
the offing.
VI.

PROPERTY

REAL AND PFESONAL PROPERTY

Little has been said concerning the acquisition of present
rights by way of title to land in Illinois, for most cases involving
aspects of real property law were of a stereotyped nature. One
significant point was made, however, in the case of Miner v. Yantis.1
The plaintiffs there concerned, who owned the record title to the
land involved, sought to have a deed to the realty and a bill of sale
for the school house erected thereon, purchased by the defendants
from the school trustees, set aside. The suit presented three technically novel questions. The first challenged the power of school
trustees to acquire title to realty in fee simple absolute except in
those cases where the title was taken either in satisfaction of a
judgment or in settlement of a debt. The second posed a question
24 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, §§ 1-21.
25 Evidence of a design to provide equality of rights appears in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, §§ 3, 5, 8, and 11.
1410 Ill. 401, 102 N. E. (2d) 524 (1951).

